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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

)

vs.

]

MICHAEL LEWIS GREEN, AKA
JAMES ALVIN DOUGLAS,

]
]

Defendant-Respondent.

]i

Case No. 900329

Priority No. 13

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITON FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-Respondent Michael Lewis Green appealed from a final
judgment and sentence of the Court below from two second degree
felony crimes, manufacturing a controlled substance, and possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, to wit, P-2-P.
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 58-37-3(3) (1986) and the portion of Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988) unconstitutional as impermissibly
delegating State legislative functions.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant testified at trial his father had been a licensed
pharmacist (Reporter's Transcript of Trial, vol. 2, hereinafter
ff

R2" 476), that Defendant had a lifelong hobby of raising tropical

plants (R2 478), fertilized, sprayed, and added nutrients to the
soil (R2 479). He had a collection of chemicals to pursue his
chemistry hobby (R2 495). He dabbled in making sprays, plant

growth hormone, and 20 to 30 other projects (R2 495). He made
solar feed, fertilizer, ammonium phosphate compounds, and materials
to change p.h. of the soil (R2 500). He had worked in the past at
jobs where he sold chemicals, and had been an officer in a chemical
company (R2 499).
At trial, the State's chemist testified that over two pounds
of P-2-P was found at the Defendant's premises (Rl 144). He
testified that he couldn't even distinguish if, of the substance
tested, it was 1% P-2-P or 50% (Rl 210-211), that it did not look
like a finished product (Rl 210), but "the end of a reaction
mixture" (Rl 210). He found no amphetamines nor methamphetamines
(Rl 215). The State criminalist, who did chemical testing, stated
P-2-P could've been a trace or contaminant produced while making
something else (R2 288).
The State says, without citation to the record, in the
Petition for Writ, p. 4, that officers found fifteen fifty-gallon
drums of phenylacetic acid, which overstates the amount by probably
a magnitude of ten-fold. First, Defendant was not charged with
possession of phenylacetic acid, which may or may not have been
legal then.

Second, the actual record says they found fifteen

fifty-pound containers "commercially labeled" phenlylacetic acid
(Rl 222), not P-2-P.
ARGUMENT
THE AUTHORITY GIVEN THE U.S. CONGRESS OR U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL
UNDER THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT TO DESIGNATE,
RESCHEDULE, OR REVISE BY ADDING, DELETING, OR TRANSFERING
SUBSTANCES ON THE SCHEDULES IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
P-2-P is nowhere found or mentioned in the Utah Controlled
Substances Act, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, Section 58-

37-1 et seq.

The term "controlled substance" is defined in two

places, Section 58-37-3 and 58-37-2 (4) (Appendix 1-6). The only
basis that the State can claim that P-2-P is a controlled substance
is under the theory that it is a controlled substance under the
Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 801 et seq.
P-2-P is not specifically mentioned in the United States Code, but,
pursuant to rules and regulations of the United States Attorney
General, and their listing in the Code of Federal Regulations at 21
CFR Section 1308.12 (g), it might be a controlled substance under
the Federal Act.

It is the Defendant's position that the attempt

to define the elements and punishment of a crime by reference to
the United States Code, or the Code of Federal Regulations,
promulgated pursuant to administrative rule making by the Unites
States Attorney General, constitutes an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority, and is therefore not constitutionally
valid and P-2-P is therefore not a controlled substance under the
Utah Controlled Substances Act.
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied the Utah Supreme
Court case directly on point, State vs. Gallion 572 P.2d 683 (Utah
1977).

Since this case has already decided the issue, there is no

need for certiorari in the case at bar.

The case involved

prosecution of the individual for making a forged prescription for
a controlled substance, Demerol.

At that time, Demerol was not a

scheduled controlled substance under the state statute, but had
been scheduled by the Utah Attorney General in acccordance with the
Controlled Substance Act.

The Utah Supreme Court held that that

was improper, that the Attorney General could not so schedule a
substance not listed in the legislative enactment, and that said

action constituted an unlawful and illegal delegation of
legislative authority under both the State and Federal
Constitution.

The Court held such on the basis of two separate but

related arguments and concerns.
The first basis for the holding of the Court is expressed in
the first half of the opinion, the separation of powers holding
dealt with in the State's Petition.

In the case at bar,

Defendant's brief (which covered the point in a scant paragraph) to
the Court of Appeals never argued separation of powers, and the
Court of Appeals naturally dispensed with the point summarily.

The

length of argument accorded it in the State's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is indicative that the State would set up the separation
of powers argument as a convenient straw man, to distract the court
from the real issue, delegation of legislative authority.

Gallion

held, on the separation of powers ground, first, as well as the
second ground, delegation, that it was unconstitutional for someone
other than the legislature to determine what was a controlled
substance, and the level of penalty therefor.
The Supreme Court however also based its decision on the fact
that the listing of a controlled substance under the Act, thereby
defining an element of and the punishment for a crime, was an
inherently legislative function that could not be delegated to
anyone.

The separate nature of this second point was made explicit

beginning at page 687 of the opinion, where the court stated:
ff

The other aspect of this case which merits response is
whether the Controlled Substance Act has improperly delegated
legislative power."
The court stated, at page 690:
"A determination of the elements of a crime and the
appropriate punishment therefore are, under our Constitutional

system, judgments, which must be made exclusively by the
legislature."
The Court discussed the Utah Controlled Substances Act and the
manner in which it worked, which has not changed substantially
since that time (with the exception of the delegation to the
Congress or United States Attorney General, as discussed below).
The statute has a number of different schedules, and defines the
seriousness of various offenses involving those substances based
upon which schedule the controlled substance is listed.

Thus, what

might be a felony to deal with a controlled substance under one
schedule might be a misdemeanor on another.

The Court discussed

other jurisdictions which had similarly held drug statutes
unconstitutional and distinguished the Federal case law which
reached a decision contrary to that reached by the Utah Court in
Gallion.

In arriving at its conclusion and decision, the Court

stated at page 689-90:
"In the Controlled Substances Act, the administrator not
only determines that a substance should be controlled, he
further schedules the substance, which in effect, declares the
magnitude of the penalty and fixes the punishment. The
administrator is exercising an essential legislative function
which cannot be transferred to him..."
"There are sound reasons for ruling the definition of a
crime and the precise punishment therefor to be an essential
legislative function, which cannot be transferred. Criminal
trials would be unduly complicated, for the defendant would
have the right to challenge the administrative procedure and
the findings where a substance has been scheduled or
rescheduled. A similar determination by the legislature could
not be challenged. The administrative rulings are not
statutes and are not incorporated into the code, a person who
wishes to abide by the law would have to resort to the
permanent register kept by the secretary of state to determine
the status of a substance."
Gallion involved the Utah State Attorney General.

The case at

bar involves the United States Congress, and pursuant to its
attempted delegation of authority, the United States Attorney

General in his adminstrative processes.

Hence, the delegation is

even more opprobrious, as more remote, and not preserving of
federalism.

Therefore, there is no way to successfully distinguish

the present case from Gal lion, supra, and therefore the attempted
inclusion of P-2-P in the Utah Act as a controlled substance is
void and without effect as being an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.
Gal lion placed Utah in a group of states whose highest courts
have found their state's enactment of the Controlled Substance Law
unconstitutional.

Further, the decision, as may be applied to

incorporation of federal statutes, is in accord with a very
respectable line of cases holding that adoption of prospective
federal legislation or federal administrative rules constitutes an
unconstitutional delegation of state legislative powers, especially
where the delegation is in future ad infinitum.
At least six states' highest appellate courts (including Utah)
have found their state's enactment of the Controlled Substances Act
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power:

State v.

Rodriguez, 379 So.2d 1084 (La. 1980); Howell v. State, 300 So.2d
774 (Miss. 1974); State v. Krego, 433 N.E.2d 1298 (Ohio, 1981);
State v. Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1970); and In Re Powell, 602
P.2d 711 (Wash. 1979).

Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeals

of West Virginia found that, pertaining to its drug statute, the
adoption of future laws (see below) of the federal government or
its agencies is unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of
legislative power (State v. Grinstead, 206 S.E.2d 912 (W.Va. 1974).
In Howell, defendant was convicted of the possession of
amphetamines.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the

statute which delegated the power to the State Board of Health to
reschedule drugs was an unconstitutional delegation of the
legislatures power to define crimes and fix the punishment for
them, as well as a violation of the State Constitution's separation
of powers clause.

The State Board had transferred amphetamines

from a Schedule III drug to Schedule II, thus increasing the
penalties.
In Krego, an identical opinion resulted from a nearly
identical rescheduling of the drug phencyclidine, in Ohio.
In Powell, The Supreme Court of Washington, in reviewing a
detention for possession of the drug Dalmane, found the legislative
delegation to the State Board of Pharmacy unconstitutional.
Although there is some conflict, it is generally held that the
adoption by or under authority of a state statute of prospective
Federal legislation, or Federal administrative rules thereafter to
be passed, constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.

(This should be especially true where the item

to be adopted would define a serious crime.)

See State v.

Intoxicating Liguors, 117 A 588 (Me. 1922) (prohibiting adoption of
the federal determination of what is an "intoxicating" beverage).
State v. Gauthier, 118 A 380 (Me. 1922).

Holgate Bros. Co. v.

Bashore, 200 A 672 (Pa. 1938) (prohibiting adoption of federal
working hours in statute).

Darweger v. Staats, 196 NE 61 (N.Y.

1935), (prohibiting adoption of prospective federal enactment on
fair competition).

Santee Mills v. Query, 115 S.E. 202 (S.C. 1922)

(prohibiting statute that state income tax be one-third of federal,
as to future federal amendments, etc.). Dawson v. Hamilton, 314
S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1958) (adopting time standards to be fixed in the

future). State v. Urguhart, 310 P.2d 261 (Wash. 1957) (prohibiting
adoption in statute of future lists of approved medical schools).
Wallace v. Commissioner of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1971)
(invalidating subsequent federal amendments of "gross income" as
determining state "gross income", for income tax).
In Seale v. McKennon, 336 P.2d 340 (Ore. 1959), a statute
requiring the Oregon State Department of Agriculture to adopt the
minimum regulations and laws of Unites States Department of
Agriculture, inter alia, was interpreted so as to avoid
unconstitutionality in legislative delegation.

Future

modifications of the federal laws and regulations were deemed not
to be included in the statute's direction.
Thus, it is seen that it has been widely held that a
legislature cannot delegate to Congress or a federal agency power
to create laws in the future.
Specifically, in the area of delegating future powers to
schedule and designate controlled substances, cases consistent with
the Utah position expressed in Gal lion are found in State v.
Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1970) and in State v. Rodriguez, 379
So.2d 1084 (La. 1980), in which cases the state statutes
specifically included provisions for automatic inclusion of any
federally scheduled drug, and on that basis, the drug statute was
found an unconstitutional delegation.

In Johnson, the statute

prohibited sale of any drug which contained any quantity of
substance designated by regulations promulated under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

Defendant was charged with selling

LSD, which was not specified on the statute, other than by
reference to the federal act.

The court held, at 895:

"'Statutes adopting laws or regulations of other states,
the federal government, or any of its agencies, effective at
the time of adoption are valid, but attempted adoption of
future laws, rules or regulations of other states, or of the
federal government, or of its commission and agencies
generally have been held unconstitutional as an unlawful
delegation of legislative power. 1 " (Citations omitted.)
"The statute does not adopt the regulations of the
federal government or one of its agencies at a given time, but
attempts to adopt any and all regulations and changes therein
promulgated under the federal act in futuro ad infinitum.
This the legislature could not constitutionally do..."
In Rodriguez, supra, the defendant was charged with possession
of Talwin.

The State Secretary of Department of Health and Human

Resources, pursuant to statute, added it to the list of controlled
substances days after the Drug Enforcement Agency of the Department
of

Justice classified Talwin as a controlled substance.

The court

held, at 1087:
"This prohibition against delegating the power to create
crimes applies not only to a delegation to a state agency,
such as the Deprtment of Health and Human Resources, but to
any other agency or body, such as the Drug Enforcement
Administration. The Louisiana legislature is not authorized
to delegate its legislative power to a federal agency, nor to
Congress."
Also, Grinstead, supra, involved a conviction for possession,
delivery and sale of the drug LSD.

Until 1968, the West Virginia

legislature had not explicitly outlawed LSD, but in 1968, Congress
amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to include LSD.

West

Virginiafs statute defined a "dangerous drug" as one described
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.

Thereafter, the

State Board of Pharmacy, with reference to the federal act,
declared LSD a dangerous drug.
indicted.

Subsequent to this, Grinstead was

The court held:

"The Legislature cannot delegate its authority to enact
criminal laws to an agency which is a unit of the exectutive
branch of State government, nor can it, under the guise of a

colorable delegation, permit the Board of Pharmacy to adopt a
federal law which has not been given prior approval by the
Legislature."
The primary objection the Grinstead court had to the
delegation was that it was a delegation to the federal government
in future
The State cites several state decisions of contrary holding,
but only two of them deal with a delegation to the federal
government, and two of them don't deal with the area of heavy
felonies.

The thread that runs through them is that some limited

delegation may be allowable if the local legislature has provided
specific standards and procedural safeguards to the delegee.

The

State has failed to, and doubtless can't, show such standards in
Utah, especially since P-2-P was purportedly outlawed under the 21
U.S.C. 811(e) no-findings exception (below).
P.2d 778 (Colo. 1988).

Clark County Sheriff v. Lugman, 101 Nev.

149, 697 P.2d 107 (1985).
1981).

People v. Lowrie, 761

State v. Peloguin, 427 A.2d 1327 (R.I.

Montoya v. OyToole, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190 (1980).

State v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 92 Wash. 2d 894, 602 P.2d 1172
(1979). It is submitted that State v. Kellogg, 98 Idaho 541, 568
P.2d 514 (1977) is a very isolated holding, since no standards were
required for what appears to be a startlingly open-ended
delegation. People v. Uriel, in Petitioner's brief, is apparently
mis-cited.
With regard to the State's argument that a court should only
reach the issue of constitutionality as a last resort, it must be
considered that welded to the question of constitutionality here is
the question of whether P-2-P was a completely legal substance or
not.

Fully three of the six issues presented to the Court of

Appeal in Appellant's Brief confront Gallion (delegation, due
process, jury instructions).

Bearing on one of the remaining

issues, probable cause, was whether the officers and issuing
magistrate shouldfve known or been informed of Gallion.

The

remaining issues, destruction of chemicals and whether the
informant was a state agent, are affected by whether the substance
was illegal or not.
The issue was not so much constitutionality, as Gallion had
decided that issue long ago, but whether Gallion was directly
controlling.

Furthermore, logically the State could never prevail

on this conviction until constitutionality was confronted, and for
it to insist on review of side issues instead of confronting
constitutionality is unnecessary circuity and delay, and a severe
injustice to a man in custody awaiting decision.
The Utah Controlled Substances Act went into effect on January
1, 1972.

Laws 1971, Ch. 145.

On March 6, 1979, the legislature

passed an amendment to the Act, which went into effect on May 8,
1979.

Laws 1979, Ch. 12.

The 1979 amendment added the new

Subsection (5) to Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 58-37-2,
providing:
f,

The words "controlled substance" mean a drug, substance
or immediate precursor included in I, II, III, IV or V or
section 58-37-4. "Controlled substance" shall also include a
drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules
I, II, III, IV or V of the Federal Contolled Substances Act
(Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised to
add, delete or transfer substances from one schedule to
another, wherther by Congressional enactment or by
administrative rule of the United States Attorney Genral
adopeted pursuant to Section 201 of that act. The words do
not include distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as
those terms are defined or used in Title 32, tobacco or food."

Subsections (2) and (3) of Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, 58-37-3, were also added, in 1979:
"(2) All controlled substances listed in the Federal
Controlled Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is
amended from time to time, are hereby controlled."
"(3) Whenever any substance is designated, rescheduled
or deleted as a controlled substance in schedules I, II, III,
IV or V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act (Title II,
P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised by
Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the
United States Attorney General adopted pursuant to section 201
of that act, that subsequent designation, rescheduling or
deletion shall govern."
These subsections survive basically unchanged in our present law.
P-2-P is not listed in the Utah Controlled Substance Act,
explicitly.
The Controlled Subtance Act (21 USCA 801 et seq.) was enacted
by Congress on October 27, 1970.

Section 811 (Appendix 7-11) sets

forth the operative language for exercise of delegations to the
Attorney General.

Subsection (a) and (b) provide a means by which

the U.S. Attorney General may add, transfer between schedules, or
remove a drug from schedules.

First, he must request a scientific

and medical evaluation, and the Secretary's recommendations, from
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (now Health and
Human Services).

Then he must make findings, and follow the

federal rulemaking procedure.
However, 21 USCA 811(e) provides the U.S. Attorney General
may, with regard to "immediate precursors", dispense with the
scientific and medical evaluations, the Secretary's
recommendations, findings, and the rulemaking procedures
altogether.

Since the requirement of findings is dispensed with,

the protective standards, factors and guidelines of 21 U.S.C.
811(c) are also discarded.

On December 7, 1979, nine months after the Utah Legislature
amended Utah Code, Sec. 58-37-2, and 58-27-3, seven months after
they went into effect, and almost eight years after the initial
Utah enactment of 58-37-2 (which contained--in Subsection 23-references to the U.S. Attorney General making findings and
designations as to precursors), the U.S. Attorney General
designated P-2-P as a "precursor", and amended Title 21, Section
1308.12, to add a new subsection "f", which caused P-2-P, also
known as phenylacetone, to be included in Schedule II of the
Federal Act.

He added P-2-P under 21 USCA 811(e), which allowed

him to dispense with, and which he used to discard, scientific and
medical evaluation, the Secretary's recommendations, findings, and
the federal rulemaking procedures.

(See Appendix 13, last

paragraph, first column.)
The effective date of the criminal prohibition of P-2-P was
even later, February 11, 1980.
240, page 71824.

Federal Register, volume 44, No.

(Appendix, 12-14.)

Unquestionably, the Utah Legislature purportedly delegated the
power to the U.S. Attorney General in May 1979 (or earlier) to make
future additions to the controlled substance schedules, and P-2-P
was added by the Attorney General subsequent to the delegation by
the Utah Legislature, on December 7, 1979, effective February 11,
1980.

As such, it was a purported delegation in futuro ad

infinitum, and unconstitutional.
Defendant raised these issues pre-trial (Reporter's Trial
Transcript vol. 1, hereinafter "Rl", 30-45) and at the end of the
State's evidence, when Defendant moved for a directed verdict

(Reporter's Trial Transcript vol. 2, hereinafter "R2" 425), but
they were denied (Rl 45, R2 432-3).
An unfortunate corollary to the improper delegation of power
by the legislature here is that, by forcing a continual search of
the Code of Federal Regulations and Federal Register, it leads tc a
deprivation of due process rights to notice of proscribed conduct.
Looking to the Utah statute for guidance, a person would not find
P-2-P, and would only find vague words such as "controlled
substance".

Grinstead, ibid, at 915, and 918, alludes to this

problem, but is unclear as to whether it is a ratio decendis.
State v. Johnson, 173 N.W.2d 894, at 895, alludes to it, in
passing. In State v. Dougall, 570 P.2d 137 (Wash.), at 138, the
court concluded:
"[i]t is unreasonable to expect an average person to
continually research the Federal Register to adetermine what
drugs are controlled substances under RCW 69.50."
This is similar to the objected-to register in Gallion, p. 690.
His Honor, Judge Low, having heard the evidence, commented on the
problem (R2 431-2):
"I think it's a disconcerting issue. As to notice and
fairness, I am aware the language in the Gal lion case which
raises that concern and issue. And I suppose it's most
bothersome to the court, to the defendant's ability to be put
on notice of changes in the federal legislation by the method
prescribed in the federal legislation. And the defendant's or
any defendant's ability to become aware of those kind of
changes."
Gallion, at 688, cites the preference in Utah for crimes to be
stated in the state statutes:
"In State v. Johnson (44 Utah 18, 26, 137 P. 632 (1913))
this court held that under the Constitution, the courts may
not denounce and punish as crimes acts and omissions not made
punishable by statute, for it is a legislative power to
declare acts as crimes and to prescribe proper penalties."

"The consititutional standard set forth in State v.
Johnson is incorporated in the Utah Criminal Code. Section
76-1-105, as enacted in 1973, amended 1974, provides:"
"Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a
crime unless made so by this code, other applicable
statute or ordinance."
Defendant raised this issue in his motion for directed verdict
(R2-426), and pre-trial (Rl 30-45), but it was denied (Rl 45, R2
432-3).
Furthermore, the statutes invite the court to deprive
Defendants of jury instructions that the prosecution must prove
administrative compliance in enacting the delegated prohibitions.
In Gallion, at 689, the Court held:
"There are sound reasons for ruling the definition of a
crime and the precise punishment therefor to be essential
legislative functions, which cannot be transferred. Criminal
trials would be unduly complicated, for the defendant would
have the right to challenge the administrative procedure and
the findings where a substance has been scheduled or
rescheduled."
Defendant tendered Jury Instruction No. 1 to the court
(Appendix, 15, 16), in compliance with this holding in Gallion.

It

simply set forth the pertinent requirements of 21 DSCA 811. The
court declined to give the instruction, and counsel for Defendant
stated his objections to the failure (R2 518-9).

Further, counsel

for Defendant objected to the giving of Instruction No. 5
(Appendix, 17, R2 521), which implicitly and erroneously assumes
the premise of what the jury would have been required to find, viz.
that P-2-P was a controlled substance.
instruction No. 5.

Nonetheless, the court gave

As a result, the Defendant was denied the right

to "challenge the administrative procedure and the findings"
(Gallion, ibid, at 689), to his serious prejudice.

Citing federal cases, the State reminds us that there is ample
federal authority for the delegation by the federal Congress to
U.S. Attorney General.

However, this misses the point entirely,

since federal delegation to federal government misses the entire
federalism problem raised when a state legislature, elected by a
local electorate, delegates to an unelected national official,
appointed by the President.

Worse, the case at bar involves an

exercise of delegation proscribing P-2-P by the U.S. Attorney
General, dispensing with all rulemaking and standards by virtue of
21 USCA 811(e), on his mere fiat.

The cited federal-to-federal

authority, in any event, even if it dealt with state delegation,
would not overturn Gallion.
For the first time in this case, in its brief at the Court of
Appeal (pp. 27, 31, and 32 of the Brief of Respondent, below), and
now here (p. 9 of Petition) the State apparently contends that P-2P was an illegal drug under Utah law alone, without reference to
federal law, as a "precursor".

The argument is that Utah Code Ann.

Sec. 58-37-2(4) (Supp. 1988), in pertinent part, defines the term
"control 1ed subtance"
"means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included
in schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also
includes a drug, substance or immediate precursor included in
Schedules I, II, III, IV or V of the federal Controlled
Substances Act...as those schedules may be revised to add..."
Presumably, the State infers that because the words "immediate
precursor" were used in the statute above, that, if P-2-P were in
chemical fact an immediate precursor, that it is thereby included,
though not named.

Under the obvious meaning of the statute,

"immediate precursors" as such are no more outlawed generically nor
specifically than are "drugs" or "substances" (words used in the

same phrase) as such, and the language cannot be stripped away from
the language "included in", etc, that follows.

"...[D]rug,

substance, or immediate precursor" is modified by "included in
Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4...".
includes only immediate precursors named in 58-37-4.

That is, it
P-2-P is not

named in the Utah Act.
The State's argument also ignores Sec. 58-37-2(16):
"'Immediate precursor' means a substance which the
Attorney General of the United States has found to be, and by
regulation designated as being, the principal compound used or
produced primarily for use in the manufacture of a controlled
substance, or which is an immediate chemical intermediary used
or likly to be used in the manufacture of a controlled
subtance, the control of which is necessary to prevent,
curtail, or limit the manufacture of the controlled
substance."
To recap, the State, despite the fact it failed to try the
case on the theory that P-2-P was a precursor described in the Utah
Code, and flying in the face of the fact the jury instructions
assumed the very fact in issue (Instruction 5--Appendix 17-informed the jury P-2-P "is a controlled substance", rather than
asking the jury to determine if it was), asserts P-2-P is a
controlled subtance because it is a precursor under state law
alone.

But the state law definition of "precursor" is, a substance

the U.S. Attorney General has designated.
question.

The agrument begs the

In short, "immediate precursor" cannot be determined

without delegation to federal laws, in futuro ad infinitum.
Without reference to federal law, there is no State "precursor", by
definition.
The State would convince us that Defendant violated Section
58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(A) and (B). Those sections read:
"(2) Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V shall consist of
the following drugs or other substances, by whatever official

name, common or usual name, chemical name or brand name
designated:
(b) Schedule II:
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture or
preparation which contains any quantity of the following
substances having a stimulant effect on the central nervous
system:
(A) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts
of its optical isomers
(B) Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of
its isomers"
Nothing here states a precursor is a salt, isomer, or salt of
its isomer.

Counsel knows of no evidence or issue put on at trial

that P-2-P was a salt, isomer, or salt of isomer, or amphetamine or
methamphetamine.
What is clear is that the case went to the jury on
instructions, not that they were to determine if P-2-P was a
precursor, or a salt, isomer, or salt of isomer, but simply that it
was a controlled substance.

Instruction SA-2 provided, in part,

the elements the prosecution had to prove were as follows:
"1. That on or about 1987 or 1988, in Box Elder County,
State of Utah;
2. That the Defendant did, knowingly and intentionally;
3. Manufacture;
4.

A controlled substance, to-wit, P-2-P."

Instructions 3 and 4 are to the same effect, the difference
being merely between possession vs. manufacture.

Defendant was not

tried on manufacture of a "salt", nor of a "precursor", but of a
specifically-named chemical in the federal lists, P-2-P.
Defendant raised the Gal lion/federal delegation issue
generally, at pre-trial (Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, 30-45), and at
the end of the State's evidence, when Defendant moved for directed
verdict (R2 425), but Gallion-concerned motions were denied (Trial
Transcript vol. 1 p. 45, R2 431-3).

(Transcript Vol. 1, page 39.)

Conclusion

Since Utah has already decided that delegations of legislative
responsibility to define felony crimes pertaining to controlled
substances, and to fashion punishments therefore, is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and since the
addition of P-2-P was done after the enactment of the statute, the
incorporation of P-2-P into the Utah statute was unconstitutional,
as a delegation, and worse, as a delegation in futuro ad infinitum.
The convoluted means of incorporating future laws, as was used
in the purported enactment of the P-2-P inclusion, fails to give
notice to persons, sufficient to assure their due process rights,
and as such is vague and confusing.
The case was not tried on a precursor basis, the court simply
instructing that P-2-P was a controlled substance-

The notion that

P-2-P was proscribed by Utah law as an "immediate precursor"
without reference to federal delegation appears for the first time,
to the knowledge of the author, at the appellate level, and is
patently unfounded, given the plain words of the statute at Section
58-37-2(4), and the definition of "immediate precursor" at 58-372(16), which defines it as being designated or found to be such by
the U.S. Attorney General, the very point at issue. He in turn,
enacted the prohibition under 21 U.S.C. 811(e), without standards.
Wherefore, Defendants asks the court to deny the petition for
writ of certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day off A^gu^f
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DANISiTR. KITOWLTON
Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

58-37-2

(7) unethical conduct as defined in the code of ethics adopted and published by the National Association of Social Workers.
History: L. 1971, ch. 138, § 11; 1977, ch.
32, § 6; 1985, ch. 187, § 78; 1987, ch. 27, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment substituted "licensee" for "person" in the
first sentence in the introductory paragraph,

inserted "clinical social worker" and "or as a
member of any other health care profession" in
Subsection (3), inserted "falsely" in Subsection
(4), and made other minor changes.

CHAPTER 37
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-7 provides that Chapter 37, Title 58 is terminated on July 1,
1997.
Section
58-37-2.
58-37-2.5.

58-37-4.

58-37-6.

Section
Definitions.
Practices of non-allopathic practitioners, herbalists, and massage therapists and use of herbs
and food supplements of vegetable origin not restricted.
Schedules of controlled substances — Schedules I through
V — Findings required — Specific substances included in
schedules.
License to manufacture, produce,
distribute, dispense, administer, or ..conduct research — Issu-

58-37-8.
58-37-9.
58-37-10.

58-37-13.
58-37-17.

ance by department — Denial,
suspension, or revocation —
Records required — Prescriptions.
Prohibited acts — Penalties.
Investigators — Status of peace
officers.
Search warrants — Administrative inspection warrants — Inspections and seizures of property without warrant.
Property subject to forfeiture —
Seizure — Procedure.
Judicial review.

58-37-1. Short title — "Utah Controlled Substances Act."
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — When may offender found guilty of
multiple crimes under Comprehensive D ug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21

USCS §§ 841-851) be punished for only one offense, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 794.

58-37-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Administer" means the direct application of a controlled substance, whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means, to
the body of a patient or research subject by:
(a) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent; or
(b) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the presence of the practitioner.
(2) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the
direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or practitioner but does not include a common or contract carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of
any of them.
(3) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a drug,
substance, or immediate precursor under Section 58-37-3.
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(4) "Controlled substance" means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also
includes a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules
I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L.
91-513, as those schedules may be revised to add, delete, or transfer substances from one schedule to another, whether by Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the United States Attorney General
adopted under Section 201 of that act. Controlled substance does not
include distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are defined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food.
(5) "Counterfeit substance" means:
(a) any substance or container or labeling of any substance that
without authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them,
of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or
persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance distributed
by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or
(b) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance.
(6) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted
transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an
agency relationship exists.
(7) "Department" means the Department of Commerce.
(8) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means:
(a) a drug which contains any quantity of:
(i) barbituric acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid; or
(ii) any derivative of barbituric acid which has been designated by the secretary as habit-forming under Section 502(d) of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 352(d));
(b) a drug which contains any quantity of:
(i) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers;
(ii) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of
amphetamine; or
(iii) any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human
Services or the Attorney General of the United States after investigation has found and by regulation designated habit-forming because of its stimulant effect on the central nervous system;
or
(c) lysergic acid diethylamide;
(d) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the
Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of
the United States after investigation has found to have, and by regulation designated as having, a potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its
hallucinogenic effect.
(9) "Dispense" or "prescribe" means the delivery of a controlled substance by a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful order of
a practitioner, and includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or
disposing of that substance as well as the packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for delivery.
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(10) "Dispenser" means a pharmacist who dispenses a controlled substance.
(11) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical.
(12) "Distributor" means a person who distributes controlled substances.
(13) "Drug" means:
(a) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia,
Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or Official
National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them;
(b) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals;
(c) articles, other than food, intended to affect the structure or
function of man or other animals; and
(d) articles intended for use as a component of any articles specified in Subsection (a), (b), or (c); but does not include devices or their
components, parts, or accessories.
(14) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who unlawfully
and habitually uses any controlled substance to endanger the public
morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of
controlled substances as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his dependency.
(15) "Food" means:
(a) any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral, or animal origin
other than a drug as specified in this chapter, and normally ingested
by human beings; and
(b) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical,
physiological, pathological, or other condition including but not limited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation,
allergy, hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight; uses
for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason of age
including but not limited to the ages of infancy and childbirth, and
also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unusual diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary property for
use of a food. Any particular use of a food is a special dietary use
regardless of the nutritional purposes.
(16) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the Attorney
General of the United States has found to be, and by regulation designated as being, the principal compound used or produced primarily for
use in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of
a controlled substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of the controlled substance.
(17) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation,
compounding, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or
indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction
and chemical synthesis.
(18) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or
labels any container of any controlled substance, except pharmacists who
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dispense or compound prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate
consumer.
(19) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus Cannabis and all parts
of the g e n u s , w h e t h e r g r o w i n g or not; the secvls of it; the resin extracted

from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term
does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the
stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound,
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature
stalks, except the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the
sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination. Any synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant Cannabis sativa or any other species of the genus Cannabis which are chemically
indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are also included.
(20) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency of the United
States or any foreign country.
(21) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced
directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of
extraction and chemical synthesis:
(a) opium, coca leaves, and opiates;
(b) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of
opium, coca leaves, or opiates;
(c) opium poppy and poppy straw; or
(d) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
or preparation of the substance, which is chemically identical with
any of the substances referred to in Subsection (a), (b), or (c), except
narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca leaves or extracts of
coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine.
(22) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an unconditional promise to pay a sum of money, which are legally transferable to
another party by endorsement or delivery.
(23) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addictionforming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being
capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addictionsustaining liability.
(24) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L., except the seeds of the plant.
(25) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust,
other institution or entity or one or more individuals.
(26) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium
poppy, after mowing.
(27) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership,
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtaining,
or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as
distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a
person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he jointly
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participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring.
(28) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharmacist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis
a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in
this state.
(29) "Proceeds" means whatever is received when an object is sold,
exchanged, or otherwise disposed of.
(30) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance.
(31) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of
debt or of property,
(32) "State" means Utah.
(33) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a controlled substance for his own use, for the use of a member of his household, or for administration to an animal owned by him or a member of his
household.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 2; 1977, ch. 29,
§ 3; 1979, ch. 12, § 1; 1981, ch. 75, § 1; 1982,
ch. 12, § 1; 1987, ch. 190, § 1; 1989, ch. 50,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 186, § 1; 1989, ch. 225, § 60.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment alphabetized the definitions and renumbered the subsections accordingly; in Subsection (5), designated the existing language as
Subsection (a), added Subsection (b), and, in
Subsection (a), deleted "controlled" preceding
the first two instances of "substance" and substituted "falsely purports to be a controlled
substance" for "thereby falsely purports or is
represented to be the product of, or to have
been"; deleted a definition of "Distribute for
value" contained in former Subsection (8); deleted "far" preceding "dependent" in Subsection (14); deleted the former undesignated
paragraph at the end of this section, which
read "This act does not infringe upon the rights
of citizens to purchase and use herbs and food
supplements of vegetable origin and does not
restrict the non-allopathic practitioners, the
herbalist, the massage therapists"; and made
minor changes in phraseology throughout the
section.

The 1989 amendment by Chapter 225, effective March 14, 1989, substituted "Department
of Commerce" for "Department of Business
Regulation" in Subsection (7) and "Health and
Human Services" for "Health, Education and
Welfare" in Subsections (8)(b)(iii) and (8)(d).
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 186, effective April 1, 1989, inserted "or a listed chemical" in Subsections (6) and (11) and corrected a
typographical error in Subsection (8).
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 50, effective April 24, 1989, substituted "species of the
genus Cannabis and all parts of the genus" for
"parts of the plant cannabis sativa L." near the
beginning of the first sentence and inserted "or
any other species of the genus Cannabis" in the
last sentence of Subsection (19) and made a
stylistic change in Subsection (33).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Federal law. — The federal Controlled Substances Act, cited in Subsection (4), is codified
as 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. Section 201 of the
Act is 21 U.S.C. § 811.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Distribution.
The evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for distribution of a controlled substance where the defendant, who was approached with a request to seH marijuana to a
police officer, agreed, quoted the selling price,

and then personally delivered the contraband
and received the money at his apartment; he
did not merely find, direct, and introduce the
officer to another drug dealer. State v. Fixel,
744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987).
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(27) to (30); and designated former Subsection
(27) as the last paragraph.

58-37-3

M e a n i n g of " t h i s a c t " . — See the note under the same caichline following S 58-37-1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Delivery.
Distribution.
Incomplete sale.
"Production."
Delivery.
The definition for delivery makes it clear
t h a t agency is not to be considered in finding
criminal culpability under the Controlled Substances Act. State v. Casias, 567 P.2d 1097
(Utah 1977).

not take place, although the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser
offense of attempt to distribute a controlled
substance. State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah
1985)

Distribution.
There was no distribution by the defendant
where an undercover police.agent gave m a n }
?f?l o°, V ^ n ^ i n d i a ^ o ^ t e V ' S o r o u s h i r n '
571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977).

"Production."
T ^ e c o o k i n g and adding of chemicals to the
m a r i j u a n a p l a n t in a n effort t o p r o d u c e «nash;>
^
a mQre
a n d concentrated form of m a r i .
juana, was sufficient to indicate defendants in{ ^
to e n g a g e in ^
processing of a con.

Incomplete sale.
Where defendant agreed to sell cocaine to an
undercover agent, and the parties then proceeded, with the cocaine, to another location in
order t h a t the agent could obtain money for the

trolled substance directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin and
to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to produce or manufacture a controlled
substance. State v. Horsley, 596 P.2d 661

purchase, a distribution of cocaine for value did

(Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 25 Am. J u r . 2d Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons & 7 et seq.
C.J.S. — 72 C.J.S. Poisons § 1.

Key N u m b e r s . — Drugs and Narcotics «=
42; Poisons «=> 2.

58-37-3. Substances which are controlled — Revised federal schedules govern.
(1) All controlled substances listed in § 58-37-4 are hereby controlled.
(2) All controlled substances listed in the Federal Controlled Substances
Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as it is amended from time to time, are hereby
controlled.
(3) Whenever any substance is designated, rescheduled or deleted as a controlled substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or V of the Federal Controlled
Substances Act (Title II, P.L. 91-513), as such schedules may be revised by
Congressional enactment or by administrative rule of the United States Attorney General adopted pursuant to § 201 of that act, that subsequent designation, rescheduling or deletion shall govern.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 3; 1979, ch. 12,
§ 2.
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21 USCS § 802, n 7
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bis plant, consequently, in prosecution for possession of marijuana, prosecution need not prove
that substance found in defendant's possession
consisted of proscribed portions of Cannabis
plant United States v Span (1975, CA10 Kan)
515 F2d 579
To extent hashish contains THC it is controlled substance under 21 USCS §802(15)
United States v Kelly (1976, CA9 Idaho) 527
F2d 961
District Court did not err in instructing jury
that 21 USCS § 802(15), which defines marijuana
as plant cannabis sativa L, comprehends other
forms of plant and prohibits possession of all
varieties of marijuana United States v Gagnon
(1980, CA10 Okla) 635 F2d 766, cert den 451
US 1018, 69 L Ed 2d 390, 101 S Ct 3008
21 USCS §802(15) outlaws all species of
marijuana
containing
tetrahydrocannabinol
United States v Lupo (CA7 Wis) 652 F2d 723,
cerr den 457 VS 1135, 13 L Ed 2d 1353, 102 S
Ct 2964)
Congress intended inclusion of indicia vanety
within definition of marijuana United States v
Moore (1970, ED Pa) 330 F Supp 684, affd
(CA3 Pa) 446 F2d 448, cert den 406 US 909, 31
L Ed 2d 820, 92 S Ct 1617

purposes United States v Stieren (1979, CA8
Iowa) 608 F2d 1135
Combined effect of statutory definitions of
"dispense" and "practitioner" is to limit meaning of "dispense" to delivery of controlled substances by physician acting in course of professional practice or research, delivery of controlled
substances outside course of professional practice
or research constitutes "distributing", which violates 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), even if earned on by
registered physician United States v Badia
(1973, CA1 Mass) 490 F2d 296 (disagreed with
United States v Genser (CA10 Colo) 710 F2d
1426)
Although statutory definition of "narcotic
drug" is broader than dictionary definition. Congress need not follow latter in applying term to
number of different classes of drugs for purposes
of legal control, classification of cocaine within
definition of "narcotic drug" under 21 USCS
§802(16) is not arbitrary and irrational United
States v Di Laura (1974, DC Mass) 394 F Supp
770
9. "Practitioner"
"Osteopathic physicians" in Kansas were not
"physicians " Burke v Kansas State Osteopathic
Asso, Inc (1940, CA10 Kan) 111 F2d 250
Doctor who acts other than in course of
professional practice is not practitioner under
Controlled Substance Act and is therefore not
authonzed to presence controlled substances and
is subject to cnminal provisions of act United
States v Rosenberg (1975, CA9 Cal) 515 F2d
190, 33 ALR Fed 196, cert den 423 US 1031, 46
L Ed 2d 404, 96 S Ct 562 and (disagreed with
United States v Genser (CalO Colo) 710 F2d
1426)

8. "Narcotic drug"
Definition of "narcotic drugs" as used in
predecessor to this section included cocaine
Lastra Padilla v United States (1960, CA5 Fla)
278 F2d 188
Legislative history of 21 USCS § 802(15) indicates definition of marijuana was intended to
only include those parts of manjuana which
contain tetrahydrocannabinol Thomas v United
States (1976, Dist Col App) 352 A2d 390
Definition of marijuana as Cannabis sativa
within meaning of 21 USCS §802(15) includes
all Cannabis, even though Cannabis sativa is
only one of several species of manjuana People
v Riddle (1975) 65 Mich App 433, 237 NW2d
491
Percodan tablets containing one per cent of
"dihydrohydroxycodemone hydrochloride" commonly called codeinone, were narcotics within
meaning of predecessor to this section Rivas v
United States (1966, CA9 Cal) 368 F2d 703, cert
den 386 US 945, 17 L Ed 2d 875, 87 S Ct 980
and (disagreed with United States v Himmelwnght (CA5 Fla) 551 F2d 991, cert den 434 US
902, 54 L Ed 2d 189, 98 S Ct 298)
Congress has perogative to classify cocaine,
which is non-narcotic central nervous system
stimulent, as narcotic for penalty and regulatory

Osteopath was "physician " Hostetler v Woodworth (1928, DC Mich) 28 F2d 1003
10. "Ultimate user"
Term "ultimate user" includes person who has
obtained drug for his own use, it does not
require that he in fact use it therefor Umted
States v Bartee (1973, CA10 Colo) 479 F2d 484
11. "United States"
Suitcase containing cocaine which had been
abandoned on luggage carousel at Miami Airport
had been imported into "United States" within
meaning of 21 USCS § 802(26) United States v
Catano (1977, CA5 Fla) 553 F2d 497, 2 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 73, cert den 434 US 865, 54 L
Ed 2d 140, 98 S Ct 199

106

21 USCS § 811

D R U G A B U S E PREVENTION

§ 803.

[Repealed]

HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
This section (Act Oct. 27, 1970, P. L. 91-513, Title II, Part A, § 103,
84 Stat. 1245) was repealed by Act Oct. 18, 1977, P. L. 95-137, § 1(b),
91 Stat. 1169. This section authonzed the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs to add 300 agents and necessary supporting personnel.
AUTHORITY TO CONTROL; STANDARDS AND SCHEDULES
§ 811. Authority and criteria for classification of substances
(a) Rules and regulations of Attorney General; hearing. The Attorney
General shall apply the provisions of this title to the controlled substances
listed in the schedules established by section 202 of this title [21 USCS
§ 812] and to any other drug or other substance added to such schedules
under this title. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), the Attorney
General may by rule—
(1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any drug
or other substance if he—
(A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential for abuse,
and
(B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance the findings
prescribed by subsection (b) of section 202 [21 USCS § 812(b)] for the
schedule in which such drug is to be placed; or
(2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if he finds
that the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for
inclusion in any schedule.
Rules of the Attorney General under this subsection shall be made on the
record after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the rulemaking procedures prescnbed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 of the United
States Code [5 USCS §§551 et seq.]. Proceedings for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of such rules may be initiated by the Attorney
General (1) on his own motion, (2) at the request of the Secretary, or (3)
on the petition of any interested party.
(b) Evaluation of drugs and other substances. The Attorney General shall,
before initiating proceedings under subsection (a) to control a drug or
other substance or to remove a drug or other substance entirely from the
schedules, and after gathenng the necessary data, request from the Secretary a scientific and medical evaluation, and his recommendations, as to
whether such drug or other substance should be so controlled or removed
as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and recommendations, the Secretary shall consider the factors listed in paragraphs (2), (3),
(6), (7), and (8) of subsection (c) and any scientific or medical considera107
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tions involved in paragraphs (1), (4), and (5) of such subsection The
recommendations of the Secretary shall include recommendations with
respect to the appropriate schedule, if any, under which such drug or other
substance should be listed The evaluation and the recommendations of the
Secretary shall be made in wnting and submitted to the Attorney General
within a reasonable time The recommendations of the Secretary to the
Attorney General shall be binding on the Attorney General as to such
scientific and medical matters, and if the Secretary recommends that a
drug or other substance not be controlled, the Attorney General shall not
control the drug or other substance If the Attorney General determines
that these facts and all other relevant data constitute substantial evidence
of potential for abuse such as to warrant control or substantial evidence
that the drug or other substance should be removed entirely from the
schedules, he shall initiate proceedings for control or removal, as the case
may be, under subsection (a)
(c) Factors determinative of control or removal from schedules. In making
any finding under subsection (a) of this section or under subsection (b) of
section 202 [21 USCS § 812(b)], the Attorney General shall consider the
following factors with respect to each drug or other substance proposed to
be controlled or removed from the schedules
(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known
(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other
substance
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance
already controlled under this title
(d) International treaties, conventions, and protocols requiring control;
procedures respecting changes in drug schedules of Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. (1) If control is required by United States
obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in
effect on the effective date of this part, the Attorney General shall issue
an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most
appropriate to carry out such obligations, without regard to the findings
required by subsection (a) of this section or section 202(b) [21 USCS
§ 812(b)] and without regard to the procedures prescribed by subsections
(a) and (b) of this section
(2)(A) Whenever the Secretary of State receives notification from the
Secretary-General of the United Nations that information has been
transmitted by or to the World Health Organization, pursuant to
article 2 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which may
108

DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION

21 USCS § 811

justify adding a drug or other substance to one of the schedules of the
Convention, transferring a drug or substance from one schedule to
another, or deleting it from the schedules, the Secretary of State shall
immediately transmit the notice to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] who
shall publish it in the Federal Register and provide opportunity to
interested persons to submit to him comments respecting the scientific
and medical evaluations which he is to prepare respecting such drug
or substance The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
[Secretary of Health and Human Services] shall prepare for transmission through the Secretary of State to the World Health Organization
such medical and scientific evaluations as may be appropriate regarding the possible action that could be proposed by the World Health
Organization respecting the drug or substance with respect to which a
notice was transmitted under this subparagraph
(B) Whenever the Secretary of State receives information that the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations proposes to
decide whether to add a drug or other substance to one of the
schedules of the Convention, transfer a drug or substance from one
schedule to another, or delete it from the schedules, the Secretary of
State shall transmit timely notice to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] of such
information who shall publish a summary of such information in the
Federal Register and provide opportunity to interested persons to
submit to him comments respecting the recommendation which he is
to furnish, pursuant to this subparagraph, respecting such proposal
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health
and Human Services] shall evaluate the proposal and furnish a
recommendation to the Secretary of State which shall be binding on
the representative of the United States in discussions and negotiations
relating to the proposal
(3) When the United States receives notification of a scheduling decision
pursuant to article 2 of the Convention of Psychotropic Substances that
a drug or other substance has been added or transferred to a schedule
specified in the notification or receives notification (referred to in this
subsection as a "schedule notice") that existing legal controls applicable
under this title to a drug or substance and the controls required by the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq ] do not
meet the requirements of the schedule of the Convention in which such
drug or substance has been placed, the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services], after consultation with the Attorney General, shall first determine whether existing
legal controls under this title applicable to the drug or substance and the
controls required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21
USCS §§ 301 et seq ], meet the requirements of the schedule specified in
the notification or schedule notice and shall take the following action
109
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(A) If such requirements are met by such existing controls but the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and
Human Services] nonetheless believes that more stringent controls
should be applied to the drug or substance, the Secretary shall
recommend to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for
scheduling the drug or substance, pursuant to subsections (a) and (b)
of this section, to apply to such controls
(B) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health
and Human Services] concurs in the scheduling decision or schedule
notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall recommend
to the Attorney General that he initiate proceedings for scheduling
the drug or substance under the appropriate schedule pursuant to
subsections (a) and (b) of this section
(C) If such requirements are not met by such existing controls and
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health
and Human Services] does not concur in the scheduling decision or
schedule notice transmitted by the notification, the Secretary shall—
(1) if he deems that additional controls are necessary to protect the
public health and safety, recommend to the Attorney General that
he initiate proceedings for scheduling the drug or substance pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, to apply such
additional controls,
(n) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified
acceptance, within the period specified in the Convention, pursuant
to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention, to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations,
(in) request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified
acceptance as prescribed in clause (n) and request the Secretary of
State to ask for a review by the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations, in accordance with paragraph 8 of article 2 of
the Convention, of the scheduling decision, or
(IV) in the case of a schedule notice, request the Secretary of State
to take appropriate action under the Convention to initiate proceedings to remove the drug or substance from the schedules under
the Convention or to transfer the drug or substance to a schedule
under the Convention different from the one specified in the
schedule notice
(4)(A) If the Attorney General determines, after consultation with the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary of Health and
Human Services], that proceedings initiated under recommendations
made under paragraph [subparagraph] (B) or (C)(i) of paragraph (3)
will not be completed within the time period required by paragraph 7
of article 2 of the Convention, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary and after providing interested persons opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the tempo110
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rary order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue a temporary
order controlling the drug or substance under schedule IV or V,
whichever is most appropriate to carry out the minimum United
States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention
As a part of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation
with the Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any provision of part C of this title [21 USCS §§ 821 et seq ]
which he finds is not required to carry out the United States
obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention In the
case of proceedings initiated under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3),
the Attorney General, concurrently with the issuance of such order,
shall request the Secretary of State to transmit a notice of qualified
acceptance to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant
to paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention A temporary order
issued under this subparagraph controlling a drug or other substance
subject to proceedings initiated under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section shall expire upon the effective date of the application to the
drug or substance of the controls resulting from such proceedings
(B) After a notice of qualified acceptance of a scheduling decision
with respect to a drug or other substance is transmitted to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with clause (n)
or (in) of paragraph (3)(C) or after a request has been made under
clause (iv) of such paragraph with respect to a drug or substance
described in a schedule notice, the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare [Secretary
of Health and Human Services] and after providing interested persons
opportunity to submit comments respecting the requirements of the
order to be issued under this sentence, shall issue an order controlling
the drug or substance under schedule IV or V, whichever is most
appropriate to carry out the minimum United States obligations under
paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention in the case of a drug or
substance for which a notice of qualified acceptance was transmitted
or whichever the Attorney General determines is appropriate in the
case of a drug or substance described in a schedule notice As a part
of such order, the Attorney General shall, after consultation with the
Secretary, except such drug or substance from the application of any
provision of part C of this title [21 USCS §§ 821 et seq] which he
finds is not required to carry out the United States obligations under
paragraph 7 of article 2 of the Convention If, as a result of a review
under paragraph 8 of article 2 of the Convention of the scheduling
decision with respect to which a notice of qualified acceptance was
transmitted in accordance with clause (n) or (in) of paragraph
(3)(Q(l) the decision is reversed, and
(n) the drug or substance subject to such decision is not required to
be controlled under schedule IV or V to carry out the minimum
111
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United States obligations under paragraph 7 of article 2 of the
Convention,
the order issued under this subparagraph with respect to such drug or
substance shall expire upon receipt by the United States of the review
decision If, as a result of action taken pursuant to action initiated
under a request transmitted under clause (iv) of paragraph (3)(C), the
drug or substance with respect to which such action was taken is not
required to be controlled under schedule IV or V, the order issued
under this paragraph with respect to bueh drug or substance shail
expire upon receipt by the United States of a notice of the action
taken with respect to such drug or substance under the Convention
(C) An order issued under subparagraph (A) or (B) may be issued
without regard to the findings required by subsection (a) of this
section or by section 202(b) [21 USCS § 812(b)] and without regard to
the procedures prescribed by subsection (a) or (b) of this section
(5) Nothing in the amendments made by the Psychotropic Substances
Act of 1978, or the regulations or orders promulgated thereunder shall
be construed to preclude requests by the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare [Secretary of Health and Human Services] or the Attorney
General through the Secretary of State, pursuant to article 2 or other
applicable provisions of the Convention, for review of scheduling decisions under such Convention, based on new or additional information
(e) Immediate precursors. The Attorney General may, without regard to
the findings required by subsection (a) of this section or section 202(b) [21
USCS § 812(b)] and without regard to the procedures prescribed by
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, place an immediate precursor in the
same schedule in which the controlled substance of which it is an
immediate precursor is placed or in any other schedule with a higher
numencal designation If the Attorney General designates a substance as
an immediate precursor and places it in a schedule, other substances shall
not be placed in a schedule solely because they are its precursors
(0 Abuse potential. If, at the time a new-drug application is submitted to
the Secretary for any drug having a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system, it appears that such drug has an
abuse potential, such information shall be forwarded by the Secretary to
the Attorney General
(g) Non-narcotic substances sold over the counter without a prescription;
dextromethorphan. (1) The Attorney General shall by regulation exclude
any nonnarcotic substance from a schedule if such substance may, under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS §§ 301 et seq], be
lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription
(2) Dextromethorphan shall not be deemed to be included in any
schedule by reason of enactment of this title unless controlled after the
112
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date of such enactment [enacted Oct 27, 1970] pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section
(Oct 27, 1970, P L 91-513, Title II, Part B, §201, 84 Stat 1245, Nov
10, 1978, P L 95-633, Title I, § 102(a), 92 Stat 3769 )
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
References in text:
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title II of Act Oct 27, 1970,
P L 9i 513, 84 Siat 1242, which appears generally as 21 USCS
§§ 801 et seq For full classification of such Title, consult USCS Tables
volumes
"The effective date of this pan", referred to in this section, is Oct 27,
1970, which is the effective date of Part B of Title II of Act Oct 27,
1970, P L 91-513, as provided by § 704(b) of such Act, which appears
as 21 USCS § 801 note "Schedule IV or V", referred to in this section,
appears in 21 USCS § 812(c)
"The Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978" referred to in this section,
is Act Nov 10, 1978, P L 95-633, 92 Stat 3768, which amended this
section, among other things for full classification of this Act, consult
USCS Tables volumes
Explanatory notes:
The bracketed words "Secretary of Health and Human Services" are
inserted on authonty of Act Oct 17, 1979, P L 96-88, Title V, § 509,
93 Stat 695, which appears as 20 USCS § 3508, and which redesignated the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare as the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and provided that any reference to the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, in any law in force on the
effective date of such Act Oct 17, 1979, shall be deemed to refer and
apply to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, except to the
extent such reference is to a function or office transferred to the
Secretary of Education or the Department of Education under such
Act Oct 17, 1979
The bracketed word "subparagraph" is inserted in subsec (d)(4)(A) of
this section as the word probably intended by Congress
Effective date of section:
Act Oct 27, 1970, P L 91-513, Title II, Part G, § 704(b), 84 Stat
1284, which appears as 21 USCS § 801 note, provided that this section
is effective upon enactment on Oct 27, 1970
Amendments:
1978. Act Nov 10, 1978, in subsec (d), designated the existing
provisions as para (1), and added paras (2)-(5)
Other provisions:
Effective date of 1978 amendment. Act Nov 10, 1978, P L 95-633,
Title I, § 112, 92 Stat 3774, which appears as 21 USCS § 801a note,
provided that the amendment of this section shall take effect on the
date the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed at Vienna,
Austria on February 21, 1971, enters into force in respect to the United
113
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"Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, this subtitle [adding 21 USCS §971 and
note and notes to § 801, and amending this section and 21 USCS §§ 830, 841, 842, 872,
876, 881, 960, 961] shall take effect 120 days after the enactment of this Act.".
RESEARCH GUIDE
Federal Procedure L Ed:
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics, Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 35:665, 35:669.
Forms:
15 Federal Procedural Forms L Ed, Statutes of Limitation, and Other Time Limits § 61:32.
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USCS § 812] if the substance is not listed in any other schedule in section 202 [21
§ 812] or if no exemption or approval is in effect for the substance under section i
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [21 USCS § 355]. Such an order may i
issued before the expiration of thirty days from—
(A) the date of the publication by the Attorney General of a notice in the F
Register of the intention to issue such order and the grounds upon which such oi
to be issued, and
(B) the date the Attorney General has transmitted the notice required by para
(4).
(2) The scheduling of a substance under this subsection shall expire at the end of on
from the date of the issuance of the order scheduling such substance, except th,
Attorney General may, during the pendency of proceedings under subsection (aXl]
respect to the substance, extend the temporary scheduling for up to six months.
(3) When issuing an order under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall be requi
consider, with respect to the finding of an imminent hazard to the public safety,
those factors set forth in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) of subsection (c), including
abuse, diversion from legitimate channels, and clandestine importation, manufactu
distribution.

INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Weight of marijuana plant stalks will not be
7. "Marijuana"
For purposes of 21 USCS § 801, et seq., mari- considered for purposes of sentence enhancement
juana is "controlled substance." United States v under 21 USCS § 841(b)OXA) (vii), where mariOne 1977 36 Foot Cigarette Ocean Racer (1985, juana was seized at stage before it was turned into
SD Fla) 624 F Supp 290.
readily marketable and consumable product and
Conviction for possession with intent to distrib- where 21 USCS §802(16) excludes stalks from
ute "quantity of hashish, substance containing definition of marijuana, because under "market
(4) The Attorney General shall transmit notice of an order proposed to be issued
tetrahydrocannabinol" will not be overturned, de- approach" adopted by Congress in legislative hisparagraph (1) to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In issuing an order
spite defendants' argument that evidence was in- tory, enhanced penalties should only apply when
sufficient to prove that what they possessed was all marijuana seized is marketable, and such interparagraph (1), the Attorney General shall take into consideration any comments si
controlled substance, and that variance between pretation avoids inequity of penalizing individual
ted by the Secretary in response to a notice transmitted pursuant to this paragraph.
description of charge or drug possessed in indict- with unmarketable marijuana same as individual
(5) An order issued under paragraph (1) with respect to a substance shall be vacated
ment and jury instructions and proof of charge or with same amount of marketable marijuana.
the
conclusion of a subsequent rulemaking proceeding initiated under subsection (a
drug possessed presented at trial requires acquittal, United States v Miller (1988, ED Tenn) 680 F
respect to such substance.
because (1) even though actual seized substance or Supp 1189.
(6) An order issued under paragraph (1) is not subject to judicial review.
chemical analysis thereof was never adduced at
trial, testimony by evidence technician who issued 8. "Narcotic drug"
(As amended Oct. 12, 1984, P. L. 98-473, Title II, Ch V, Part B, § 509(a), 98 Stat 2072
substance to undercover agents who sold it to
In determining whether certain substance was
defendants, by police officer present with drug dog opiate derivative drug enforcement agency adminHISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
at scene of arrest, and by forensic chemist who istrator under 21 USCS §802, may consider the
Amendments:
gave definitions of "hashish" and "sea-hash" was substance's pharmacological effects as aspect of
1984. Act Oct. 12, 1984, in subsec. (g) added para. (3); and added subscc. (h).
sufficient to show beyond reasonable doubt that definition of "derivative," and administrator's resubstance seized from defendants was illegal "de- jection of "2-step" definition of derivative in which
RESEARCH GUIDE
rivative of marijuana" under 21 USCS §§812, it is said that substance is derivative of another
802(16), and (2) defects in indictment and jury
Federal Procedure L Ed:
only
if
it
can
be
produced
from
it
in
only
one
or
2
instructions which mistakenly characterized hashFood, Drugs, and Cosmetics, Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 35:513, 35:540-545, 35:547-548, 35:629.
ish seized as "substance containing THC" instead chemical operations, is sufficiently reasonable and
Am Jun
of "derivative of marijuana" neither confused jury consistent with the act's purposes to warrant judi2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 395.
nor affected any substantial right of defendants so cial deference, particularly considering the admin-j
as to require upset of conviction under 21 USCS istrator's expertise in area. Reckitt & Colman, Ltd.
v
Administrator,
Drug
Enforcement
Admin.
§ 841(a)(1). United States v McMahon (1987, DC
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
6. Judicial review
(1986, App DC) 788 F2d 22.
Me) 673 F Supp 8.
quired to respond to petition for such a ru
1. Constitutionality
to inform petitioner that petition will i
§ 811. Authority and criteria for classification of substances
21 USCS § 811(h) is permissible delegation of accepted because rule falls outside scope of
Olsen
v Drug Enforcement Admin. (1985,
congressional
power
and
is
not
so
arbitrary
that
it
(a)-(f) [Unchanged]
does not comport with due process, since tempo- Fla) 776 F2d 267.
(g) Non-narcotic substances sold over the counter without a prescription; dextromethorphan.] rary scheduling criteria are as specific as reasonPrevious delegation of permanent schedui
J
(1), (2) [Unchanged]
ably practicable to meet imminent threat to public Attorney General to Administrator of DE>
(3) The Attorney General may, by regulation, exempt any compound, mixtur
safety while providing sufficient guidance, absence not delegate power to schedule drugs temp
preparation containing a controlled substance from the application of all or any part oj ot notice and public comment is permissible where under 21 USCS § 811(h), since procedure ar
this title if he finds such compound, mixture, or preparation meets the requirements oj temporary scheduling is emergency measure last- of Administrator in temporary scheduling
at most 18 months, lengthy public comment most entirely different than permanent schc
one of the following categories:
I ing
would jeopardize public safety, and public hearings
(A) A mixture, or preparation containing a nonnarcotic controlled substance, whicM are held for consideration of permanent schedul- under § 811(a), and failure of Congress or
mixture or preparation is approved for prescription use, and which contains one oa ing, constitutionally imposed requirement of judi- ney General to challenge or correct Adini
tor's actions, or tacit approval of those acti
more other active ingredients which are not listed in any schedule and which arJ cial review would invalidate many statutes which not substitute for express delegation of aut
included therein in such combinations, quantity, proportion, or concentration as tof preclude judicial review, harsh punishment of United States v Emerson (1988, CA9 Cal) ft
tnose distributing temporarily scheduled sub- 541.
vitiate the potential for abuse.
n 0 t i r r a t i o n a l raeans
of reducing hazard,
(B) A compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any controlled substance] H * ? "
Guidelines under 21 USCS {811(h) arc
which is not for administration to a human being or animal, and which is packaged ill and determination of imminent threat to safety ciently precise for delegation of legislative
such form or concentration, or with adulterants or denaturants, so that as packaged i] without scientific evaluation is reasonable basis for to Attorney General to temporarily add subt
temporarily scheduling substances. United States v
does not present any significant potential for abuse.
.,.-,,.
I tmerson (1988, CA9 Cal) 846 F2d 541.
to Schedule I of Controlled Substances A
USCS §§801 et seq.) if necessary to avoid
(h) Temporary scheduling of substance in schedule I to avoid imminent public safety hazard] 2. Administrative procedures
(1) If the Attorney General finds that the scheduling of a substance in schedule I [2 ti^ d r m i n i s t r a t i v c r u , e authorizing religious exemp- nent hazard to public safety; thus, tern
placement of 3.4 methylenedioxymethamphei
USCS § 812] on a temporary basis is necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the publij tion tor use of marijuana may not be made under (MDMA)
on Schedule I by Drug Enfon
safety, he may, by order and without regard to the requirements of subsection (b) relatinj authority of 21 USCS §811; however, administra- Administration is permissible. United Sti
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, schedule such substance in schedule I [2] ««- oi Drug Enforcement Administration is re- Lichtman (1986, SD Fla) 636 F Supp 438.
34
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eleven utilities which responded to the
Notice argued that revocation of { 2 14
would be in the public interest.
Niagara-Mohawk Power Company
stated that the same information is
reported to the New York Energy Office,
to the New York Public Service
Commission as part of rate cases, and to
the Electric Power Research Institute
where it is catalogued and made
available to the public. Georgia Power
Company stated that the S 2.14 reports
are redundant because of other reports
required by other agencies.
Consolidated Edison Company of New
York noted its belief that reports filed
under this section were not susceptible
to use as a basis for Commission
findings.
Effective Date
This rule is to be elective January 1,
1980.
(Federal Power Art as amended 16 U.S.C.
792-828i:, Department of Energy Organization
Art. 40 U.S.C. 7101 7352. E.O. 12009. 42 FR
4«2«7)
In consideration of the foregoing, Part
2. Subchapter A of Chapter I, Title 18.
Code of Federal Regulations is hereby
amended as set forth below, effective
January 1. 1980.
By the Commission.
Kenneth F. Plumb,
Srcrvtary.
§2.14 (Revoked)
Section 2.14 is revoked.
|KR Hoc 7lt lt*m Ft'«d I M I - 7 9 . *4S «m)
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
21 CFR Part 1306
Schedules of Controlled Substances;
Schedule II Placement of
Phenylacetone; (Phenyl-2-propanone,
P2P, benzyl methyl ketone, methyl
benzyl ketone)
AOIMCV: Drug Enforcement
Administration. Justice.
ACTION; Final Order.
SUMMARY: This is a T trial Order issued
by the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration placing the
substance, phenylacetone. also known
as phenyl 2 propamine, benzyl methyl
ketone methyl benzyl ketone and P2P,
into Schedule II of the Controlled
Substances Act. This action results from
th»* increasing evidence of use of
phenylacetone H $ I major immediate
chemical precursor to methamphetamine

and amphetamine in their illicit
clandestine synthesis. The effect of the
present Order provides regulatory
controls upon the manufacture,
distribution, dispensing, Importation and
exportation of this immediate precursor
to methamphetamine and amphetamine.
IrTlCTtVI DAT! OF SCHIOUUIII
CONTROL: February 11,1980, except as
otherwise provided in
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Section of this Order.
FOR FURTM1R INFORMATION CONTACT:
Howard McClain, Jr., Chief, Regulatory
Control Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Telephone: 202-6331366.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In
enacting the Controlled Substances Act
in 1970, Congress provided in Section
201(e) of the Act a mechanism for
allowing the Attorney General to place a
drug or chemical iuto a schedule of
control without the requirement of first
obtaining a medical and scientific
evaluation and recommendation from
the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, without having to make
findings of his own on abuse and public
health risk, or concerning the schedule
considered, and without the need to
provide an opportunity for a rulemaking
hearing on the record in accordance
with the Administrative Procedures Act
(5 U.S.C. 551-559). In lieu of these
procedures otherwise required for the
traditional scheduling of drugs or other
substances, Congress allowed the
Attorney General to schedule a drug or
substance if it was found by him to be
an immediate piecurlor as defined in
Section 102(22) of the Act. That section
provides as follows:
The term "immediate precursor"
means a substance—(A) Which the
Attorney General has found to be and
by regulation designated as being the
principal compound used, or produced
primarily for use, in the manufacture of
a controlled substance; (B) Which is an
immediate chemical intermediary useo
or likrlv to be used in the manufacture
of sin I
trolled substance: and (C)
The conn >i of which is necessary to
prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture
of such controlled substance.
In establishing this alternative
scheduling procedure, Congress
intended to dispense with the formal,
and sometimes lengthy, administrative
regulatory rulemaking process in cases
where the risk was that clandestine
laboratories were making controlled
substances with < hemicals which
themselves were not controlled, but
whir.h were one step removed from
fur?iH-.'/ rut or becoming the controlled
subMUiruvn illicitly manufactured.

Congress recognized the need for this
summary scheduling mechanism as it
considered testimony provided to the
House Select Committee on Crime, 91st
Congress, 2nd Session, 1970-1971, (H.
Rept. No. 91-1807, p. 25-6). which stated
that entrepreneurs willing to set up
clandestine laboratories to manufacture
amphetamine and methamphetamine
would find easy manufacture and
realize high profits.
DEA's own investigations have
documented 268 illicit
methamphetamine and 45 illicit
amphetamine laboratories, seized from
1975 to November 1979. More important,
the illlicit methamphetamine
laboratories seized in the first eleven
months of this year is 106, compared
with 11 seized in all of 1975. These
statistics appear more alarming when
one considers that DEA's enforcement
effort obviously cannot account for 100%
of the illicit laboratories in operation.
Better control by DEA over this illicit
activity could be obtained if essential
ingredients used in the illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine and
amphetamine were regulated as are the
end-products—controlled substances.
DEA's investigations have shown that
at least three out of four
methamphetamine laboratories seized
since 1976 made, purchased or used
phenylacetone in one of two synthetic
methamphetamine manufacturing
processes. Of those, the more popular
process to make methamphetamine is
the reductive amination of
phenylacetone with methylamine in
ethanol with aluminum foil and mercuric
chloride catalysts. The second
mentioned process to make
methamphetamine is designated as the
Leuckart synthesis where phenylacetone
is heated with formic acid and
methylamine and hydrolyzed with
hydrochloric acid. Both processes can
produce amphetamine if methylamine is
simply replaced by ammonia (salts).
DEA laboratories have analyzed seized
samples of methamphetamine and
amphetamine of illicit manufacture and
have identified in those samples trace
amounts of phenylacetone.
These investigations and laboratory
analyses support the conclusion that
most of the illicit methamphetamine and
amphetamine produced by clandestine
laboratories resulted from their use of
phenylacetone as an essential ingredient
in the process.
Other trace substances have been
found in the above-mentioned
methamphetamine and amphetamine
samples seized and analyzed. The trace
substances have been identified as byproducts of syntheses and side reactions
where phenylace»»oe or its pret.u»sor.
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phenylacetlc acid w n an essential
ingredient. This further establishes an
additional concern that illicit
'^oratories, manufacturing
<nrthamphetamine and amphetamine, in
tome cases made, rather than
purchased, their own pheylacetone This
capability drives the exposure ot illicit
laboratory activity deeper from law
enforcement's view by replacing the
marketplace transaction of purchasing
phtmytacetone with the hidden activity
of making it
Currently, the Drug Enforcement
Administration relies upon its Precursor
Liaison Program to identify excessive or
suspicious sa'as, by manufacturers and
wholesalers to questionable purchaser*
of chemicals for their likely use in the
illicit manufacture of controlled
substances. Participating in this program
are at least one manufacturer and
numerous wholesalers of phenylacetone.
However, participation is voluntary, and
in the face of dramatically rising
numbers of seizures of illicit
methamphetarnine and amphetamine
laboratories in recent years, the obvious
present need calls for requiring, not
requesting, sales and distribution
records and reports, security measures
and import restrictions, to control this
essential chemical used in the illicit
manufacture of methamphetarnine and
amphetamine.
Such requirements would include
DEA registration of purchasers and
sellers of phenylacetone. and likely
would result in diminishing the
unhindered sales transactions now
occ urrina.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing,
the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration hereby
finds in accordance with Section 102(22)
of the Act (21 U S.C 802(22)). that
phenylacetone:
(1) Is the principal compound used, or
pioduced primarily for use. in the
manufacture of the Schedule I!
controlled substances
methamphetarnine or amphetamine.
(2) Is an immediate chemical
intermediary used or likely to be used in
the manufacture of such substances, and
(3) The control of which is necessary
to prevent, curtail or limit the
manufacture of such controlled
subetances.
Therefore, phenylacetone is an
immediate precursor" of
methamphetarnine and amphetamine at
defined in Section 102(22) of the Act (21
I S C 802(22)) and thus may be placed
in Schedule II M* are methamphetarnine
and amphetamM>t». wttmtut the necessity
of makins the findings otherwise
required by Sections 201(a) end 202fb) of
the Act (21 U S C 611(a) and W2(b}) and

without regard to the procedures
otherwise required by Section 161(a)
and (b) of the Act (21 U.8.C. t l l ( a ) end
(b)) Such procedures which, under the
authority ol Section 201(e) of the Act (21
U . S C 811(e)). peed not be required in
controlling immediate precursors,
Include the rulemaking procedures ea
set forth in the Administrative
Procedures Act (I U A C 531-460). and
the opportunity for a hearing on the
record.
Therefore, the Administrator of the
Drug Enforcement Administration
hereby dispenses with issuing Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, and the
opportunity for a hearing on the record,
and issues this Final Order piecing
phenylacetone into Schedule II of the
Act as an immediate precursor to
methamphetarnine and amphetamine,
out of high regard for the need for
prompt controls over phenylacetone
without undue delay, which effective
amphetamine and methamphetarnine
control demands, and in recognition of
the statutory authority to regulate
precursors expeditiously in any event
Even so. the Administrator is
establishing the dates on which the First
Schedule II controls shall be imposed
upon the legitimate manufacture,
distribution, dispensing, importation,
and exportation of phenylacetone to be
no sooner than February 11. I960.
Within this two month period between
publication of this Order and the first
effective dates imposing regulatory
controls for phenylacetone, ell
interested persons may submit
comments and objections related to the
issue whether, and to what extent the
required compliance by industry with
Schedule II controls will or might likely
hinder tbeir legitimate manufacturing
and sales activities with phenylacetone
so as to outweigh the expected benefit
to result from Schedule II placement of
phenylacetone in curbing illicit
manufacture of methamphetarnine and
amphetamine The Administrator
affords this opportunity for comment
notwithstanding that he has earlier
asked for comments by interested
persons on this same i* me (40 FR 47525.
October 9,1975). In r» •-.»• nse thereto,
twenty nine letters wejt- M-« t ived and
the general nature of them was that
phenylfl'f tone is used in the
pharma* > Meal industry to make
amphetamine and amphetamine like
products, and minimally in research.
Most respondents stated phenylacetone
w HZ rmt ufirff fr> *h*ir imhutriel
processes, which included rubber
proc essing and the manufacture of
chemicals Five opposed control citing

that additional recordkeeping and
security measures could be burdensome
The Administrator, however, iateods
to learn how Industry would currently
regard this present control action, and
for this reason, is offering the sixty day
comment period established by this
Order.
Should the Administrator receive
comments or objections on the
aforementioned issue which raise
significant questions on the ability of
industry to comply with Schedule II
controls for phenylacetone. he shell
immediately suspend the effectiveness
of this Order as it relates to this
imposition of Schedule II regulatory
controls until he may reconsider that
portion of this Order in light of such
comments and objections so filed.
Thereafter, he may reinstate, revoke or
amend this Order as he determines is
appropriate.
Comments should be submitted in
quintuplicate to the Administrator. Drug
Enforcement Administration. United
States Department of Justice. 14001
Street. NW\ Washington, DC. 20637,
Attention: DEA Federal Register
Representative. Dated* December 7,
1979.
Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C 811(e)
and regulations of the Drug Enforcement
Administration and of the Department
of Justice, the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration hereby
orders that phenylacetone be Included
in Schedule II of the Act. and that
11306.12 of Title 21. Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) be amended by
creating a new subsection (f).
designated Immediate precursors, and
including therein phenylacetone aa set
forth below. Additionally, the
Administrator takes the present
opportunity to make a non-substantive
change in the listing of other immediate
precursors, by removing 1
phenylcyclohcxylaminc, and 1piperidinocyclohexanecarbonitrile
(PCD), which are immediate precursors
to phencyclidine (PCP), from where they
currently appear in subsection (e)
(DepressHiita) of | 1308.12 and re listing
them in the new subsection (f). and by
re-numbering Secobarbital as Item (5) in
| tmi2(e).
130*12 totissttNIt
•

•

•

•

•

(f) Immediate precursors Unless
specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material,
compound, mixture, or preparation
which contains any quantity of the
following substances:
(1) Immediate precursor to
amphetamine and methamphetarnine:
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(i) Phenylacetone—S501
Some trade or other names: phenyI-2propanonr, P2P; benzyl methyl ketone;
methyl benzyl ketone;
(2) Immediate precursors to
phencyclidine (PCP):
(i) 1-phenylcyclohexylamine—7460
(ii) 1-piperidinocyclohexanecarbonithle
(PCQ-eeo3
Effective Dates

1. Registration. Any person who
manufactures, distributes, dispenses,
import* or exports phenlyacetone or
who proposes to engage in such
activities, shall submit an application
for registration to conduct such
activities in accordance with Parts 1301
and 1311 of Title 21 of the Code of
Federal Regulations on or before
February 11,1980. Applications for
registration should be sent by registered
mail, return receipt requested, to: United
States Department of Justice, Drug
Enforcement Administration,
Registration Section, P.O. Box 28083,
Central Station, Washington, D.C. 20005.
2. Security. Phenylacetone must be
manufactured, distributed and stored in
accordance with i§ 1301.71,1301.72(a),
(c), and (d), 1301.73.13O1.74(aH0.
1301.75{bMc) and 1331.76 of Title 21 of
the Code of Federal Regulations on or
before June 12,1980. From now until the
effective date of this revision, it is
expected that manuiacturera and
distributors of phenylacetone will
initiate whatever preparations as may
be necessary, including undertaking
handling and engineering studies and
construction programs, in order to
provide adequate security for
phenylacetone in accordance with DEA
regulations so that substantial
compliance with this provision can be
met by June 12.1980. In the event that
this imposes special hardships, the Drug
Enforcement Administration will
entertain any justified requests for
extensions of time.
3. Labeling and Packaging. All labels
on commercial containers of, and all
labeling of phenylacetone packaged
after June 12.1980. shall comply with the
requirements of fg 1302.03-1302.05 and
1302 08 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. In the event this effective
date imposes special hardships on any
manufacturer, as defined in Section
102(14) of the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 802(14)), the Drug
Enforcement Administration will
entertain any justified requests for an
extension of time.
4. Inventory Every registrant required
to keep records who possesses any
quantity of phenylacetone shall take an

inventory pursuant to J J 1304.11-1304.19
of Title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, cf all stocks of such
substance on hand on February 11,1980.
5. Records. All registrants required to
keep records pursuant to H 1304.21*
1304.27 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations shall maintain such records
on phenylacetone commencing on the
date on which the inventory of such
substance is taken.
8. Reports. All registrants required to
file reports with the Drug Enforcement
Administration pursuant to 88 1304.371304.41 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations shall report on the inventory
taken under paragraph 4 above and on
all subsequent transactions.
7. Order Forms. The order form
requirements of 88 1305.01-1305.18 of
Tide 21 of the Code of Federal
Regulations shall be in effect on the date
which the initial inventory of this
Schedule II controlled substance is
taken, March 11,1980.
8. Quotas. Quotas shall be established
in 1980 for phenylacetone pursuant to
8 8 1303.01-1303.37 of Title 21 of the
Code of Federal Regulations.
Applications for procurement quotas
and manufacturing quotas should be
submitted not later than February 11,
198a
9. Importation and Exportation. All
importation and exportation of
phenylacetone shall, on or after
February 11,1980, be required to be in
compliance with Part 1312 of Title 21 of
the Code of Federal Regulations.
10. Criminal Liability. The
Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration, hereby orders that any
activity with respect to phenylacetone
as a Schedule II controlled substance
not authorized by, or in violation of, the
Controlled Substances Act or the
Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act, conducted after February 11,
1980, shall be unlawful, except that any
person who is not now registered to
handle phenylacetone as a Schedule II
controlled substance but who is entitled
to registration under such Acts may
continue to conduct normal business or
professional practice with
phenylacetone between the date on
which this Order is published and the
date which he obtains or is denied
registration: provided, that application
for such registration is submitted on or
before February 11,1980.
11. Other. In all other respects, this
Order is effective February 11,1980.

Dated: December 7,1979.
Peter B. Bensinfer,
Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration.
(FR Doc 7S-M114 PlUd 1 a-11-7ft 846 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Offic* of Assistant Sscrstary for
Housing—FsdersI Housing
Commlsslonsr
24 CFR Part 207
(Docket No. R-79-754]
Amsndmsnts to Part 207 To Changs
ths Minimum Numbsr of Units
Required for Projects Insured Under
Section 207 of the National Housing
Act
AGENCY: Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Housing—
Federal Housing Commissioner.
ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: Sections 207.24 (a) and (b)
and 207.32a of Subpart A are being
amended to reflect the change from 8 to
5 in the minimum number of units
required for projects insured under
section 207 of the National Housing Act
as authorized by the Housing and
Community Development Amendments
of 1978.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 2,1880.
ADDRESS: Rules Docket Clerk, Office of
the General Counsel, Room 5218,
Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 451 Seventh Street SWWashington, D.C 20410.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

George O. Hipps, Jr., Office of
Multifamily Housing Development
Room 8128, 451 Seventh Street SW„
Washington, D.C. 20410; Phone: (202)
755-5720. (This is not a toll free number.)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section
207 of the National Housing Act has
required that a multifamily project or a
mobile home park have a minimum of
eight units to be eligible for mortgage
insurance. This minimum number was
changed to five by the Housing and
Community Development Amendments
of 1978 enacted October 27,197a With
this change, proposed projects of 5, 8,
and 7 units will be eligible for mortgage
insurance. Existing multifamily
apartment housing projects of five to
seven units will also be eligible under
tart 207 pursuant to section 223(f) of ths
National Housing Act.

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are i n s t r u c t e d t h a t u n d e r t h e laws of the State of Utah
Phenyl-2-Propanone, or P-2-P, i s n o t a controlled s u b s t a n c e .

How-

e v e r , if a s u b s t a n c e has b e e n l a w f u l l y made a controlled s u b s t a n c e
u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l Controlled S u b s t a n c e s Act, t h e n i t i s controlled
u n d e r t h e Utah Controlled S u b s t a n c e s Act.
Therefore, if t h e State proves beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt:
A: 1.

B:

That t h e United S t a t e s Attorney General by r u l e
s c h e d u l e d t h e s u b s t a n c e P-2-P or P h e n y l - 2 - P r o p a none as a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ;

2.

That t h e United S t a t e s Attorney General made a
f i n d i n g , after a h e a r i n g i n accordance with his
r u l e m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s , which a t l e a s t allowed for
a h e a r i n g on t h e r e c o r d , t h a t P-2-P h a s a p o t e n t i a l
for a b u s e ;

3.

T h a t t h e United States Attorney General found t h a t
t h e s u b s t a n c e P-2-P:
a. Has a p o t e n t i a l for a b u s e l e s s t h a n t h e d r u g s
on s c h e d u l e s I a n d I I ;
b . Has a c u r r e n t l y accepted medical use i n t r e a t ment i n t h e United S t a t e s ; and
c . Abuse of t h e s u b s t a n c e may l e a d to moderate
or low p h y s i c a l dependence or high psychological
dependence; a n d

4.

T h a t notice of s a i d action was p r o p e r l y p u b l i s h e d i n
i n t h e F e d e r a l Register a n d t h e Code of F e d e r a l Regu l a t i o n s . ; or

Txhat the United States Attorney General p r o p e r l y found,
p u r s u a n t to a h e a r i n g and i n accordance with h i s r u l e making a u t h o r i t y , t h a t P-2-P was an immediate p r e c u r s e r
in t h a t :
a . t h e Attorney General h a s found i t to be a n d by
r e g u l a t i o n d e s i g n a t e d as being t h e principal compound
used, or produced p r i m a r i l y for use, i n t h e manuf a c t u r e of a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ;
b . I t i s a n immediate chemical i n t e r m e d i a r y used or
l i k e l y to be used i n t h e manufacture of a c o n t r o l l e d
s u b s t a n c e ; and

c. The control of which is is necessary to prevent
curtail, or limit the manufacture of such controlled
substance.
then you may determine t h a t the substance P-2-P or Pheny1-2-Propanone is a controlled substance under Utah Law.
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INSTRUCTION NO .

^

You are instructed that Phenyl-2-Propanone or
P2P is a controlled substance under the laws of the State of
Utah.
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